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This is the eleventh of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation.  
Privatisation of animal healthcare systems in developing countries, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, has had very limited success. Introduced with inadequate transition 
time and too few resources, many livestock owners either cannot afford or, just as 
likely, are unable to gain access to the services they need. Poor livestock owners in 
remote rural areas suffer the greatest disadvantage. This fact is undisputed but, since 
privatisation, the primary focus has been on analysing the performance of animal 
healthcare systems and few authors have studied the underlying economic theories 
that have driven privatisation policy nor examined in what ways these may have been 
detrimental. 
This working paper examines how the economic analysis of animal health services has 
evolved since the '90s. A comparison is made with economic theories underlying the 
provision of human healthcare services where the debate started much earlier (in the 
‘60s). Special emphasis is put on how these perspectives have influenced privatisation 
policy and, in particular, based in general economic literature, how the way in which 
'public goods' is defined affects their financing and provision. Following this 
perspective, the role that governments should expect to play in the animal healthcare 
sector post privatisation is also debated.  
A  r e l a t i v e l y  n e w  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  e c o n o m i c  a n a l y s i s  o f  a n i m a l  h e a l t h  s e r v i c e s  i s  
therefore presented, one that has been propounded recently by a number of 
economists working in this field. This economic theory, based on the perspective of 
'public choice' argues that the process of decision-making may be highly significant in 
influencing efficiency and effectiveness. Traditional 'outcome' analysis omits factors 
such as self-interested behaviour and political interference. These may have 
contributed to higher than expected 'transaction' costs and, therefore, to the failure 
in many instances of the privatisation process. Given that much greater attention than 
in the past should be paid to issues of governance, governments in future may expect 
to act not only as external agents with regulatory power but as part of the nation's 
animal healthcare system with responsibility for defining overall goals and 
harmonising and facilitating the market economy.  
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the author, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).  
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The first economic analysis of the provision of animal healthcare services (and of 
livestock services in a broader sense) was undertaken by the World Bank in 1991-1992 
(1, 2). Its aim was to provide guidance to governments in developing countries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, on the privatisation of services based on economic 
principles. In most developing countries however, privatisation has not delivered the 
desired results. Since privatisation, the primary focus of research into livestock 
services has been directed towards analysing their performance while only few 
authors have revisited the underlying economic theories that had driven the policy of 
privatisation in the first place (3-8). 
The perspective taken in the present study differs from most previous ones. Firstly, it 
takes a retrospective look at the evolution of economic theory of animal health 
service privatisation, providing alternatives for examining the sector following various 
pure economic theorists and their underlying philosophical perspectives. Secondly, the 
study builds on a comparative analysis using economic theories developed in the 
human healthcare sector, which were developed in the 1960s and 1970s, that is much 
earlier than in the animal health sector, in order to identify reasons for the failure of 
the process of privatisation of animal healthcare in many developing countries. This 
study also highlights explores ways of improving the current sub-optimal performance 
of animal healthcare services. 
Objectives 
The specific objectives of the study were fourfold: 
1.  To highlight the evolution of the perspectives taken in the past in relation to the 
economic analysis of animal health services (AHS) and their implications. 
2.  To explore the value of adopting a new approach to the empirical economic 
analysis of animal healthcare systems. 
3.  To examine what the role of government should be in the animal healthcare sector. 
4.  To provide guidance on how to smooth the transition process of privatisation of 
animal health systems (AHS) in developing countries. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
To objective (1) & (2): 
•  The application of economic theory to guide the process of privatisation of animal 
health systems varies in relation to several factors: The privatisation process 
cannot to be applied in a homogeneous way. Influencing factors such as the 
physical, political and institutional contexts need to be taken into account. There 
is no standard model applicable to the privatisation process. 
To objective (3):  
•  The role of government should be viewed at a broader level as coordinator of 
activities in the animal healthcare sector (increasing cross-sector collaboration), Executive summary 
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the aim being not only to reduce transaction costs, but also, and especially, to 
guide current initiatives towards a common goal for AHS. 
To objective (4):  
•  In countries that have not undergone privatisation, cost-containment measures 
could be applied in order to smooth the transition process to a privatised AH 
market (where applicable). 
•  In countries where privatisation has been undertaken, efforts should focus on 
governance of the AHS, such as the creation of an integrated national animal 
health system in which activities of the different actors involved are coordinated. 
•  There is a need of further research in relation to the overall organisation of animal 
health systems and their financing in order to enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness. 1 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background of the study 
The first economic analysis of the provision of animal healthcare services (and of 
livestock services in a broader sense) was undertaken by the World Bank in 1991-1992 
(1, 2). Its aim was to provide guidance to governments in developing countries, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, on the privatisation of services based on economic 
principles. In most developing countries however, privatisation has not delivered the 
desired results. Since privatisation, the primary focus of research into livestock 
services has been directed towards analysing their performance while only few 
authors have revisited the underlying economic theories that had driven the policy of 
privatisation in the first place (3-8). 
The perspective taken in the present study differs from most previous ones. Firstly, it 
takes a retrospective look at the evolution of economic theory of animal health 
service privatisation, providing alternatives for examining the sector following various 
pure economic theorists (other than Samuelson) and their underlying (different) 
philosophical perspectives [such as Williamson, Buchanan, Peston, Coase, Cullis, 
Stiglitz, etc]. Secondly, the study builds on a comparative analysis using economic 
theories developed in the human healthcare sector, which were developed in the 
1960s and 1970s, that is much earlier than in the animal health sector, in order to 
identify reasons for the failure of the process of privatisation of animal healthcare in 
many developing countries. 
The study focuses on the rationale for comparing human and animal healthcare 
sectors, reviews the different perspectives taken by economic theorists in empirical 
economic studies and examines the implications of differing perspectives for the 
analysis of the animal healthcare sector. It aims to provide guidance on the possible 
role of government in countries where the privatisation of animal healthcare services 
has been undertaken and attempts to identify the actors and factors that determine 
how these services function and, in turn, how these actors and factors can be 
influenced. Further, the study endeavours to draw lessons from past experiences that 
could be of use for those countries that still have to undergo privatisation of animal 
health services. 
1.2  Objectives 
The specific objectives of the study were fourfold: 
1.  To highlight the evolution of the perspectives taken in the past in relation to the 
economic analysis of animal health services (AHS) and their implications. 
2.  To explore the value of adopting a new approach to the empirical economic 
analysis of animal healthcare systems. 
3.  To examine what the role of government should be in the animal healthcare sector. 
4.  To provide guidance on how to smooth the transition process of privatisation of 
animal health systems (AHS) in developing countries. 1. Introduction 
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1.3  Methodology and materials 
The reference materials used for the study were extracted from the extensive 
literature review undertaken during the author’s doctoral thesis research on the 
linkages between  animal health care systems and public health  (i.e. split 
responsibilities between ministries of agriculture and health). Only selected 
references from the larger pool of literature are quoted in this study. 
The literature selected for the present study pertains to two major topics: the 
economics of animal health services and economic theory. 
The literature review for the first topic was performed in the following databases: 
 
Database  Years  Key words used for the search 
Ingenta (including Medline)  1997-2002 
BIDS   1997-2002 
Web of Science  All years 
SIGLE All  years 
Agris 1975-2003 
Agrícola 1984-2003 
CAB Abstracts  1984-2003 
PubMed/Medline 1976-2003 
International Bibliography of Social 
Sciences  1981-2003 
!  Economics animal health 
!  Animal health services 
!  Veterinary services 
!  Livestock health 
!  Community animal health worker 
!  Community health worker 
!  Finance veterinary services 
(Available tools in each database were 
used to expand, limit or combine the 
above key words)  
 
Databases were limited to articles in English, French and Spanish languages. 
Literature for the second topic was based on the review of key authors in economic 
theory. 
1.4  Organisation of the paper 
The paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter two introduces the underlying 
rationale for the comparison of animal and human healthcare sectors, followed by a 
definition and description of AHS and related activities. This chapter also presents the 
philosophical perspective taken in the study and argues the reasons for market failure 
in the AH sector. Chapter three provides an overview of the taxonomy of goods (and 
services) following different viewpoints in economic theory and their implications. 
Chapter four focuses on publicly provided private goods and the role of government, 
with special attention on remote rural areas in pre- and post-privatisation settings. 
Finally, chapter five presents the conclusions and proposes some policy 
recommendations. 3 
2.  ECONOMICS OF ANIMAL HEALTH SYSTEMS 
2.1  Rationale for the comparative analysis of human and animal 
healthcare sectors 
Umali-Deininger and de Haan (2) were pioneers in analysing the livestock service (and 
thus animal healthcare) sector from an economic perspective as was D.K. Leonard by 
comparing animal and human health systems. The underlying rationale of Leonard's 
comparison was based on the similarities existing between the two systems at 
scientific and structural/organisational levels. Hence, Leonard’s starting point for 
the comparison lies in that “the biological science that undergirds human and 
veterinary medicine is the same; in fact a great deal of medical research on which 
the treatment of humans depends is actually veterinary research, for it is conducted 
on an array of animals. Although the various species of mammals do have important 
differences in their responses to disease and treatment, there are significant 
physiological parallels and many diseases – and cures - pass back and forth across the 
human / animal divide” (4). Not only did he match the scientific side of the two 
professions but he also highlighted that “physicians and veterinarians receive similar 
training, work in professions that are structured much like one another, and oversee 
analogous hierarchies of paraprofessionals and auxiliaries”, and enjoy an information 
advantage over their clients (4). 
However, important differences exist between the two professions. First, the two 
professions have different histories and thus different conventions and goals. Second, 
specialisation is not as extensive in veterinary medicine as in human medicine. Third, 
hospitals play different roles in the two professions in relation to treatment. Fourth, 
distance is a heavier constraint for receiving or obtaining professional care in the 
animal health field than in the human health one (4, 5). And fifth, different values are 
attached to human and animal life. 
While accepting that there are differences, nevertheless their similarities give 
sufficient common ground to enable empirical comparisons between the systems. 
However, before beginning a market analysis of animal healthcare systems it is 
necessary to define their components and structure. 
2.2  Defining animal health systems 
Defining the boundaries of AHS has been attempted by several authors (1, 2, 9). Some 
services, for example clinical services, are always included in such definitions. 
However, other aspects affecting animal and human health, e.g. extension, public 
health
1, are not always systematically taken into account. 
One of the main purposes of AHS evidently is to improve animal health in order to 
increase animal production and hence human nutrition and welfare. There is, 
however, another aspect of AHS that is usually overlooked: its contribution to the 
protection of human health. This follows the lines of thought of Murray and Frenk 
(10), who define human healthcare systems after the concept of ‘health action
2. Their 
                                                 
1 Public health would not only include the classical zoonotic disease control and prevention and meat inspection, but also 
s o m e  a s p e c t s  g e n e r a l l y  n e g l e c t e d  t o  d a t e  s u c h  a s  h y g i e n e ,  food processing and conservation, as well as animal waste 
management. Other aspects related to public health are those linked to research and development such as the use of animals 
as models for the development of new technologies’. 
2 “A health action is defined by any activities whose primary intent is to improve or maintain [human] health” (10). Given 
that AHS are also intended to, first, prevent the occurrence of disease (from food or animal origin) in humans (hence helping 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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definition puts forward the conflict arising when dealing with some parts of the animal 
healthcare sector. Due to the dual nature of public health aspects of AHS, frameworks 
for analysing the subject with a systematic and methodical approach (of either 
economic aspects or funding mechanisms) have not yet been sufficiently developed. 
The next sections introduce the different components of the ‘broader’ definition of 
AHS that will be followed by a taxonomy of AH services along the perspectives of 
different economic schools. 
2.3  The structure of animal health services 
Umali et al. (2) divided animal health services (AHS) into three main categories: (i) 
curative services, (ii) preventive services and regulatory bans and (iii) pharmaceutical 
supply. In this study, this definition is enlarged to include three other components: 
(iv) public health, (v) education/extension and (vi) research and development. Of 
course all these elements are closely intertwined. 
First, curative services relate mainly to the treatment of diseased animals through 
diagnosis and the use of drugs. Second, preventive services are meant to stop 
occurrence of new cases of disease in animals. This is achieved through the use of 
vaccines, the eradication or control of vectors and/or carriers, and through the 
application of measures such as segregation. Examples of preventive services include: 
dipping, quarantine, slaughter of at risk animals, movement restrictions, import and 
export control of livestock products, inspection and control of animal products, etc. 
Third, the supply of pharmaceuticals for livestock (for both curative and preventive 
measures) includes the production of veterinary pharmaceuticals, and the quality 
control, marketing and distribution of the products. The fourth category, public 
health, relates to the control of zoonotic and food-borne diseases, hygiene, food and 
feed safety and environmental aspects
3. The fifth component encompasses extension 
in animal health and nutrition and public health education. Finally, the sixth 
component relates to research and development. Although Umali et al. included this 
category in preventive services it is important to treat it separately as it concerns not 
only research in livestock vaccines and disease-resistant or tolerant breeds but also to 
the elaboration and assessment of new technologies and delivery mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                                          
to "maintain [human] health"), and second, to increase production and as a consequence human nutrition and welfare (thus 
to "improve [human] health"), it can be argued that AHS are eligible as part of the activities included in the concept of 
'health action'.  
3 Environmental aspects relate to, for example, water contamination due to mismanagement of animal waste, vector control 
(e.g. zoonotic vector-borne diseases control such as Sleeping Sickness, Rift Valley Fever, Chagas disease, etc.) 2. Economics of animal health systems 
5 
Figure 1:  Components of Animal Health Services (adapted from Ahuja et al., 2000) (7).  
 
However, rather than by technical concepts, animal health services can also be 
classified and defined following economic concepts. Some of these economic 
concepts, which are important for the analysis of animal healthcare systems, are 
introduced in this chapter. 
2.4  A public choice approach to the analysis of animal health 
services 
In 1975, Buchanan (12) drew attention to methodological issues regarding the analysis 
of public expenditure and the nature and structure of collective decisions of what was 
the traditional public finance approach. Following theories on government behaviour, 
the government’s role can be analysed (i) through the public interest approach or (ii) 
through the public choice school (11).  
The public interest approach looks at markets and governments in an idealised way, 
based on the underlying assumption that public interventions are able to eliminate 
inefficiencies caused by market failure. Using this approach, to date, economic 
analysis in the animal healthcare market has mostly focused on outcome efficiency. 
This refers to the Pareto optimum or top-level efficient economy
4. This is the 
perspective that was taken by most authors in the AH field at the beginning of the 
privatisation process in developing countries (see authors like Umali-Deininger, de 
Haan, and Bekure). Briefly, what this perspective emphasizes are the requirements for 
allocation of resources to reflect individual preferences and ensure that each good or 
service is priced at its marginal cost, relative to the other services these resources 
might have produced. This traditional ‘outcome’ approach, exemplified in the 
                                                 
4 Pareto efficiency: resource allocations that have the property that no one can be made better off without someone being 
made worse off (13). 
ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES 
Research and Development 
!  Vaccine development 
!  Breed improvement  
!  New technologies 
Extension/Education 
! Health extension 
!  Nutrition extension 
!  Public health education  
Vet. public health 
! Zoonotic / food-borne 
disease control 
!  Meat inspection 
!  Food and feed safety 
!  Environment 
Pharmaceuticals 
!  Production 
!  Supply / distribution 
!  Quality control 
!  Marketing 
Curative services  Preventive services 
Prevention 
!  Vaccination 
!  Vector control/eradication 
Regulatory bans 
!  Slaughter of diseased animal 
!  Movement restrictions/quarantines 
!  Diagnostic and 
treatment of sick 
animals 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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economic literature by Musgrave (1959) (14) and Musgrave and Musgrave (1989) (15), is 
normative in orientation in that it tries to demonstrate how ‘economically correct’ 
decisions can be determined for the public sector. 
The public interest perspective was taken by the above-mentioned authors with the 
aim of advising governments in developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa 
in view of the fiscal collapse of most of the states, also known as the ‘Great African 
Depression’ during the 1980s and 1990s (4), on which components should be privatised 
in the animal healthcare sector. This approach was new in the early 1990s and 
economic theory backed up the reasoning, but it should be noted that, to date, the 
privatisation process of AHS has in most countries not resulted in the expected 
positive outcomes. Hence, there is a need to consider other economic theories that 
could be applied to the analysis of AHS, to assess the main differences between the 
previous and other economic theories, and to identify possible reasons for the failure 
of the privatisation process while giving feasible alternatives to redress the current 
situation. 
The perspective taken in this paper for the analysis of AHS is that of public choice 
theorists, who consider that public interventions and interests can add inefficiencies 
to existing regulation. They believe that governments are not free in their choices but 
depend on powerful interest groups. Hence, given the context and political interests 
behind national agricultural agendas in most developing (as well as developed) 
countries, policy-makers’ choices and behaviours cannot be separated from the 
interests affected by the decisions taken. Similarly, an economic perspective first 
used by Wiseman in 1980 (16) is referred to as process efficiency, which recognises 
the weakness of the principle of marginal equivalence in detracting attention from the 
equally important efficiency in allocative techniques
5. Thus, the perspective has 
changed from viewing the government as ‘outside’ of the analysis and largely 
‘unproblematic’ (interested in outcome efficiency) to a point of view that includes 
non-market determined decision-making. Wiseman emphasises that attention should 
be drawn towards the procedures of decision-making and not exclusively to the 
outcomes. The underlying challenge is to determine whether an alternative decision-
making process could have produced a ‘closer to optimal’ outcome. In relation to the 
AH field, this is the most recent perspective taken and mostly relates to authors like 
Leonard, Koma and Ahuja. This perspective is new in the AHS in that previous authors 
did not consider decision-making processes to hinder reaching optimal outcomes. 
Along the lines of public choice theory, Stigler (1971) (17) first discussed the idea that 
regulation is the result of special interests that provide financial and political support 
in return for favoured legislation. Hence, there is a demand for political favours 
arising from special interest groups. An example of this situation is given by the 
current reluctance of some members of the Kenyan Veterinary Board in legalising the 
status of community-based animal health workers (CAHWs). Laffont and Tirole (18) 
have tried to extend the public choice perspective to reflect the regulatory 
environment and capture the nature of the constraints that prevent the regulator 
from implementing the preferred policy. Three key constraints were highlighted: 
information gaps
6, transaction costs
7 and administrative and political constraints
8. 
Relating to the agricultural and public health context is the example highlighted by 
Propper in 1995 (19) where she raised the issue of regulatory capture. This refers to a 
                                                 
5 Refers to how access to animal healthcare services will be rationed or priorities set to attribute resources efficiently.   
6 Referring to whether the regulator has sufficient information or if it has to be obtained, and how costly this process may 
be. 
7 In the presence of a regulatory contract the cost of writing this contract as well as the surrounding contingencies should be 
taken into account. 
8 Administrative procedures. 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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regulating agency which has close association with the regulated and thus may be 
more sympathetic towards the latter than to other stakeholders. The regulatee 
‘captures’ or takes control of the regulator and sets the regulatory process to work on 
their behalf. An important policy example of this situation was provided by the 
handling of the BSE crisis in the UK. The UK’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF)
9 was ‘captured’ by powerful industrial interest groups and therefore 
failed in its way of dealing with the crisis (19). 
In summary, the outcome or ‘traditional approach’ refers to normative or welfare 
economics
10, which shows how ‘economically correct’ decisions can be arrived at in 
the public sector, while the process-oriented or public choice school, although 
implying normative analysis, takes a more positive economics
11 perspective as it takes 
into consideration the self-interested behaviour of the different actors in the public 
sector context. What these two schools have in common is the fact that they are 
based in the so-called ‘methodological individualism’
12. 
Given the highly politicised environment surrounding the agricultural sector, a move 
from a traditional economic analysis of the animal healthcare market towards a public 
choice school analysis is recommended. The reasons for market failure in the animal 
healthcare sector should also be analysed using the same 'public choice' perspective. 
2.5  Market failure in the animal healthcare field 
Following Stiglitz (13), there are six conditions under which markets are not Pareto-
efficient. These conditions are referred to as market failures and they provide a 
rationale for government activity. These are (i) failure of competition, (ii) existence 
of public goods, (iii) presence of externalities, (iv) presence of incomplete markets, 
(v) information asymmetries or failures and (vi) macroeconomic distortions. This paper 
will focus on the conditions existing in the animal healthcare market and the presence 
of failures and rationale for government intervention will be discussed. 
For markets to result in Pareto efficiency there must be perfect competition. This 
means there must be a sufficiently large number of ‘firms or producers’ each believing 
it has no effect on prices. Taking into account that the ‘producer’ in the AH sector 
refers to animal health related workers
13 it is possible to highlight at least two 
settings, which are likely to differ in terms of competition. The first one is the urban 
setting where, as in the human health field, theoretically there is more availability of 
private primary healthcare facilities and the consumer is able to choose between what 
the market offers and prices will be ‘adjusted’ by the competition
14 between service 
providers. The second setting refers to remote rural areas. In these areas, there are 
not enough private suppliers of health services (either for animal heath or human 
health) for market competition to lead to Pareto-efficiency. 
For the prices of animal health services to be determined by competitive pressure in 
either of the two settings there is a need for sufficient availability of veterinarians 
and animal health assistants. Because veterinarians and animal health related 
                                                 
9 Now called DEFRA (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). 
10 Normative economics attempts to evaluate or judge alternative policies, weighing up the various benefits and costs. 
11 Positive economics uses and constructs models that describe and predict either how the economy will change or the effects 
of different policies. 
12 Individuals are the units of analysis and best judges of their welfare, individual valuations of arrangements are what 
matter.  
13 Veterinarians, animal health assistants (AHAs), community animal health workers (CAHWs), etc. 
14 Of course at this stage information asymmetries arise so that this competition is not perfect. But this is another market 
failure which is analysed later in this section.  2. Economics of animal health systems 
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professionals usually require licenses in order to practice, licensing practices are likely 
to have an effect on competition. Veterinarians may therefore have a degree of power 
over the market if they are able to control the granting of licences to prospective 
colleagues. They may be in a position to restrict the competitive forces that should 
help to minimise animal healthcare costs. If entry to the profession is restricted 
(barriers to entry) the amount of healthcare provided will be less than what would be 
expected by market forces as there will be fewer veterinarians. As there is a limited 
supply, prices of veterinary services will be higher than what they would have 
otherwise been. Yet, it has often been argued that licensing is required to maintain 
standards
15. This however leads to the recurrent problem in most remote rural 
settings of unlicensed providers of services and advice. Even if standards are set to 
deliver quality animal healthcare services, the lack of staff in remote rural areas
16, 
combined with the existing demand from livestock keepers for AHS, has led to the 
emergence of black markets and illegal drug sellers. 
Nevertheless, delivering veterinary services exclusively through a private market 
would also incur failures as there are public goods, that either will not be supplied by 
the market or, if supplied, would be supplied in insufficient amounts. Although the 
existence of ‘pure’ public goods has been widely debated in the economic literature 
and will be further elaborated on in relation to the AH field in Chapter 3, it is possible 
to acknowledge the presence of goods of low-rivalry and low-excludability in the AHS. 
Also, following Stiglitz (13), public goods can be seen as an extreme form of 
externality. Or, stated in another way, externalities might be seen as a form of 
impure public goods
17. Several examples can be found in the AH sector which highlight 
the presence of externalities arising from farmers’ or producers’ actions and some are 
given in Chapter 3. Therefore another market failure applies to the animal healthcare 
market, as economic theory predicts that resource allocation driven by pure market 
forces under the presence of externalities will not lead to optimal efficiency. 
Public goods and services are not the only goods and services that private markets do 
not provide adequately. Whenever private markets fail to provide a good or service, 
even though the cost of providing it is less than individuals are willing to pay, there is 
a market failure referred to as incomplete markets. In a perfect market, consumers 
know exactly what they want, when they want it and where they can get it. In the 
healthcare setting this would be possible only if the ‘consumer’ could foresee and 
plan for what is going to happen in the future. There are situations in animal 
healthcare that can be planned in advance as, for example, the avoidance of 
production losses due to worm infections through regular deworming. However, there 
are many items of animal healthcare consumption that cannot be planned in this way 
as animal disease may strike suddenly and/or unexpectedly. In addition, the health 
care required to overcome such problems might be expensive or even unaffordable 
(either as one-off payment or, if the condition persists over a period of time, through 
accumulation of costs). These situations are at the origin of health insurance markets, 
both whether state owned or privately run, that help counteract the financial burden 
of uncertain effects of animal ill-health. 
Two types of incomplete markets can arise: insurance markets and complementary 
markets. The question why insurance markets are imperfect has been extensively 
researched in the past two decades (13) and three answers have been put forward: 
                                                 
15 The imbalance of information between consumer and provider arises also at that level. 
16 Depending on the country, the fact that there is no staff in those areas is not because of lack of licensed veterinarians but 
to the fact that they are not willing to work in remote rural areas due to the lack of infrastructure and amenities and often 
presence of insecurity. This is the case for example of Kenya. 
17 For a clear distinction between public goods and externalities, please refer to Evans 1970 (20). 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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deterrents to innovation; transaction costs; and asymmetries of information and 
enforcement costs. 
Innovation refers not only to the creation of new technologies, diagnostic methods 
and drugs, but also to the design of new (animal health or livestock) insurance 
policies. The fact that there is no patent protection for such policy innovations 
creates a disincentive to innovation and as a result there will be under-investment in 
the development of insurance mechanisms (13). As mentioned by Williamson (21), 
following Arrow’s earlier debates in relation to property rights and information, “if 
investment in innovation cannot lawfully be protected or if nominal protection (e.g. 
patent) is ineffective, then (i) the ex-ante incentives to make such investments are 
impaired and (ii) the incentives to embed such investments in protective ex-post 
governance structures are increased” (21). 
The non-introduction of many of ‘insurance products’ is related to transaction costs. 
Williamson pioneered the analysis of markets using the ‘transaction cost’ approach
18. 
The underlying principle introduced by Williamson into economics is the organisation 
of transaction costs to minimise effects of individuals’ bounded rationality
19 whilst 
safeguarding them from opportunism. Along these same lines, Dugger (22) highlights 
the role of the State as a transaction cost minimiser. However, he regards the State 
differently than the traditional public finance school and sees the state as an agent 
that “defines property rights, resolves disputes and monitors performance” (11). 
When engaging in the AH market, an insurance firm
20 might be reluctant to invest in 
the design of a (new) insurance policy if it is unsure whether anyone will buy the 
policy. 
Large organisations have the possibility of reducing the costs per unit produced as 
they can distribute the fixed costs across their products
21 leading to economies of 
scale. In markets where there are several competing insurance companies, economies 
of scale are unlikely to arise as each company has its own administrative and 
marketing costs
22. A larger administration could spread the administrative costs over 
more consumers and thus costs per consumer would be reduced. However the problem 
of an insurer monopoly which could be exploitative may arise. A public monopoly 
would be an alternative as low costs could be maintained without the risk of 
exploitation. This ‘friction cost’ or transaction cost could also reduced if premium 
collection were ‘piggy-backed’ on to the tax collection system. 
Neoclassical economic theories consider transaction costs to be zero or very small and 
this is why market mechanisms are often thought to be better than any form of 
government intervention
23. However, as mentioned above, Williamson shows that 
transaction costs are likely to arise in the real market economy. As an example in the 
human health care field, a study by Evans (1984) (23) demonstrated that the 
                                                 
18 Briefly, analysing market from a transaction cost perspective pinpoints the difficulties in which markets run in the 
presence of the following three conditions (i) asset specificity with respect to user/s, (ii) bounded rationality of individuals 
(i.e. individuals exhibit limited computational and information processing capacities), and (iii) opportunistic self-seeking 
behaviour. In situations where all three apply, contracts cannot successfully deal with the situation (11). 
19 Individuals’ bounded rationality refers to the limited computational and information processing capacities of individuals 
(11). 
20 For example a cooperative delivering AHS to several farmers, livestock insurance, etc. 
21 An example might be marketing as no matter how many people are insured, marketing costs remain the same. Thus the 
more people insured the less expensive are marketing costs per consumer. This also applies for administrative tasks as 
processing bills and collecting premiums. 
22 The administrative and marketing costs per individual might be higher than when these costs are shared within a bigger 
population size. 
23 To decide whether a good or service should be provided publicly, there is a need to compare the savings in transaction 
costs plus the gain from increasing consumption, with the loss from excessive consumption of the good plus the loss from 
distortions created by the taxes required to finance the provision of the good or service (13). 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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expenditure on administration as a percentage of total human health care expenditure 
in the USA was 5.2 percent compared to 1.5 percent in Canada. Thus, the more 
privately-oriented human health care system in the USA appears to be 
administratively more costly than the more publicly-oriented Canadian system. When 
looking at animal health services, some similarities with Evans’ comparison arise. 
Transaction costs in animal health services can comprise transport costs for accessing 
services, to social distance (as mentioned by Woods (24), which refers to gender, 
wealth and educational differences between the animal health service provider and 
the herder, as well as with the systems of drug sales/distribution. High transaction 
costs can be expected in remote rural remote areas not only because access is 
generally limited due to lack of infrastructure and/or means of transport but also 
because of the likelihood of wide social distance. Unfortunately, in the animal health 
literature there is little data on the economic burden incurred as a result of different 
types of transaction costs. 
A large number of animal health service initiatives can be found in African countries 
post-privatisation, either private (i.e. business oriented) or not-for-profit. According 
to Williamson (21), given the absence of a clearly defined governance mechanism, the 
presence of overlapping activities leads to an increase in ‘friction costs’. The fact that 
logistics of service delivery are not coordinated between many of these initiatives 
increases transaction costs. There is also a problem of lack of willingness to harmonise 
work, not only among for-profit organisations, but especially, and (perhaps) strikingly, 
among not-for-profit initiatives. Some of the ongoing projects are competing for the 
same market; hence they have no incentive to coordinate their logistics, nor their 
ultimate goals. In Asian countries, the setting is different as most services continue to 
be delivered, at least in theory, by the public sector. However, government 
veterinarians have recently been allowed private practice after fulfilling their public 
duties. This creates an incentive for them to deal with clients during their private 
practice time and not during public work hours. Hence, inefficiencies (thus costs) 
arise as practitioners ‘draw’ work they would be paid for under public funds into 
‘private’ domain.  
The third set of reasons for imperfections in insurance markets relates to asymmetries 
of information and enforcement costs. An insurance company or cooperative that 
provides animal health services is normally less aware of the animal health risks than 
the farmer enrolling. Hence, adverse selection is likely to arise. Adverse selection is a 
consequence for insurance markets arising from information asymmetry. Herders tend 
to have better knowledge about the risk status of their animals than insurers. 
Insurance companies may have no idea of the risk status of particular animals or herds 
and a premium reflecting the general animal health risk would be collected
24. The 
premium paid by all those who take out insurance would be the same. This is called 
‘community-rating’ and reflects the ‘average risk’ level of the insured livestock 
population. For those livestock keepers who perceive that their animals are at low 
disease risk, this premium might seem too high. Therefore they will choose not to 
insure their livestock. The consequence will be that the average risk of the insured 
livestock population will rise due to low risk herders not insuring. As the average risk 
will now be higher, the premium will need to rise and other farmers will opt out of 
the insurance scheme. This process, whereby the lowest risks drop out of the insured 
group is called adverse selection. In a competitive market the response of insurance 
companies will be to tailor their insurance premiums to the risks of various groups of 
herders (for example in relation to the number, age, and breed of animals as well as 
bio-security measures adopted), rather than leaving a low risk group of non-insured 
farmers. This method of premium setting is called ‘experience rating’. As a result of 
                                                 
24 Risk can be calculated in relation to different variables. These can be: the number of animals, type of breeds, disease 
status in the zone where the farmer is settled, probability of disease occurrence… 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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this process, higher risk groups
25 might have to pay higher insurance premiums to 
maintain coverage which they might not be able to afford. This process, whereby low 
risk individuals are drawn into low-premium plans is referred in the literature as 
‘cream-skimming’ or ‘cherry picking’ (25, 26). 
Furthermore, in the animal health sector there are also problems associated with the 
absence of complementary markets. This is of most relevance in developing countries 
where large-scale coordination is required in order to develop certain types of 
programmes (13). The integration of the sparse initiatives that deliver animal health 
in rural and peri-urban areas (NGO programmes, private initiatives, etc.) into a wider 
national animal health system will need some degree of government coordination. 
Therefore one of the objectives of government development agencies is to provide 
that coordination. However, as mentioned earlier, governments too face transaction 
costs, enforcement problems and asymmetries of information although in many 
instances they differ from those in the private sector. As pointed out by Leonard (4, 
5), a number of countries have suffered a significant increase in transaction costs 
within the state activities since their independence. These come, for example, from 
corruption, patronage and inflated public payroll. Incentives in these conditions tend 
to be perverse, negative or weak, leading to low levels of public sector performance. 
It has been shown that in incomplete animal healthcare markets there are 
information failures. Assuming perfect knowledge in a healthcare market means that 
the consumer (herder) is aware of the health status of his animals and knows all the 
options available to contribute to the improvement of their health. It is also assumed 
that the herder knows how much each of these options can contribute to enhance 
their animals’ health and is able to evaluate the relative quality of each of these 
options. From a market economic perspective, customers of both human and animal 
health services have less knowledge and information on the available 
treatment/preventive options than the physicians or veterinarians respectively (4, 5). 
Buyers and sellers have unequal information, which is easily explained by the fact that 
physicians and veterinarians have invested considerably in their education and 
training. For minor common ailments and chronic diseases, herders may be aware not 
only of the condition of their animals but also of the treatment options available (e.g. 
mastitis). However, this is less likely to be the case for acute, severe and rare 
conditions, while sub-clinical disease would go unnoticed. Accumulation of knowledge 
by livestock keepers is determined by the regularity in which they uses the market as 
some elements of knowledge are obtained by accumulation of ‘learning from 
mistakes’. 
Given the technological relationship between veterinary services and animal health, 
and taking into account that the health market is not regularly visited, herders will 
often not be in a position to judge what the consequences of certain diseases would 
be in the absence of a veterinary service. In these cases the advice of a qualified and 
knowledgeable ‘expert’, who is familiar with the ‘market’, i.e. a veterinarian, is 
required. The need for an expert is further enhanced by the nature of the decision 
faced by the consumer. Depending on the commodity, taking the wrong decision might 
only have minor consequences. However, in the animal healthcare market errors in 
decision making can lead to serious consequences, which might go well beyond what 
an individual might afford. A farmer might for example lose his entire herd, a country 
might lose an export market or a zoonotic disease could seriously affect consumers. 
The information asymmetry between the practitioner and herder leads to an agency 
                                                 
25 The higher risk groups could be poor and uneducated (in animal health) smallholders, but could also include those who are 
not necessarily poor, but start raising livestock without animal health knowledge.  2. Economics of animal health systems 
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relationship between the provider and the recipient of animal health services
26. Such 
relationship links with Arrow’s agency theory (27) highlighting the possibility that 
moral hazard
27 arises. 
In insurance-based healthcare systems there is the possibility of ‘excess demand’, 
known as moral hazard, not only from the consumer’s side but also from the 
provider’s side (30). Consumer’s moral hazard arises in two facets and will depend on 
what the stock owner is insured against. First, the fact of being insured reduces the 
financial burden of having diseased animals. Thus, these situations become less 
undesirable and incentives to apply preventive measures are diminished resulting in 
increased probabilities of requiring veterinary care. Second, should disease appear, 
the insured herder does not have to pay (or very little) for veterinary services at the 
point of use, which encourages him to use more than he would otherwise have done. 
Provider’s moral hazard can result from a lack of awareness of costs
28, or from the 
use of fee-for-service (FFS) remuneration for veterinarians in which fees depart from 
‘market’ prices. In systems using FFS as a remuneration method, veterinarians are 
paid a fee for each item of service provided to herders. Conventional wisdom in such 
systems says that veterinarians have an incentive to provide care in excess of what 
would be the case if trading were done with fully informed consumers. This 
phenomenon is also known in the literature as ‘supplier-induced demand’ (30). If the 
fee is greater than the true competitive price, then there will be an incentive for 
over-providing. On the other hand, if the fee is lower than its true competitive price, 
there will be an incentive to under-provide. 
Because of the asymmetry of information, consumers are not able to temper this 
behaviour and when using a third party payer or insurer, consumers do not even have 
an incentive to moderate such behaviour. It is therefore important to counteract 
moral hazard and this is normally done through financial incentives or disincentives as 
for example a capitation
29 form of payment. However, these mechanisms will depend 
on the financing structure of the healthcare system in each country, which in turn is 
related to what consumers (herders) want from the providers (veterinarians). There is 
an added agency problem in so far as agents (service provider) and principals’ (third 
party payer) utility curves will differ. The agent may well be able to indulge in many 
complex moral hazards as well as over-supply. This agency problem may be acute in 
rural areas where unsupervised staff are left to undertake tasks that few can monitor. 
                                                 
26 The principal / agent theory has been extensively discussed in the human health literature (27, 28, 29). However, an 
attempt of comparison between the two health fields has only been done by D.K. Leonard (4). Following his reasoning, and 
adapting Mossialos et al. transaction model to the animal health setting, we are able to explain the interactions between the 
different actors in this triangle. The simplest form of transaction is by direct payment where the consumer (first party: stock 
owner or herder) pays the provider (second party: veterinarian and/or auxiliaries) directly in return of the good or service. 
However healthcare systems have often developed another player: the third party or insurer. This can be a public or private 
body and has been created to offer protection to a population (herders, stock owners and the society) against the financial 
risk of falling ill (in the animal health setting it refers to the risk of animal illness and/or zoonosis occurrence) and allows 
risks to be shared within a defined population. It is a means to achieve interpersonal redistribution (in this case between 
herders and between herders and the society). To finance healthcare services, the third party must collect the revenue from 
the population in a direct or indirect way. This revenue is then used to reimburse the herder or the veterinarian. 
27 Following the assumption of perfect knowledge consumers (herders) would act freely in their own interest when deciding 
what to consume/purchase and what not to consume/purchase. Under the same conditions, suppliers (veterinarians) would 
also act in their own interest when providing commodities most highly valued by consumers relative to their prices. But 
taking into account the lack of perfect knowledge in the health care market on the part of the herders or stock owners, 
veterinarians are often placed in the position of providing expert advice to herders about care to be provided by themselves 
or their colleagues. Thus the supplier of care is able to influence substantially the demand for that care. 
28 Lack of awareness of the price of the drugs prescribed for example. 
29 Capitation is often used in the human healthcare sector as a method of payment in primary care (this applies to the private 
– e.g. health maintenance organisations (HMOs) - as well as public context). “Doctors receive an annual payment in advance 
to care for each individual who elects to join their lists. The main advantage claimed for this method is that it motivates 
doctors in the primary care sector to practice in a way that encourages patients to join their lists although it could be in the 
doctor’s advantage to attract only low-cost people” (25). Calculating the capitation fee may differ from a single flat rate for 
all patients to a risk related calculation fee. 2. Economics of animal health systems 
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Finally, the last failure that can arise in the animal healthcare market relates to 
macroeconomic distortions. AHS in many developing countries are highly dependent 
on foreign aid coming from different countries' donors and/or development agencies. 
Recommendations from international agencies on how funds should be allocated also 
relate to the overt and hidden agendas of donors, which may positively or negatively 
affect the animal health sector. 
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3.  DEFINING PUBLIC GOODS 
Economic theory and principles have been largely used for the analysis of different 
types of markets. The neoclassical economic theory applied to the human healthcare 
field developed rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. In the animal health sector, however, 
the debate about the provision of animal health services only started roughly a decade 
ago
30 (1992, see Umali-Deininger et al. (2)). The fundamental reason for this debate 
related to the widespread public financial crisis in various countries in the developing 
world at that time. Given the context of lack of public or government funds, animal 
healthcare services were classified following the ‘outcome’ approach rationale and 
governments were advised to privatise all animal health services which fell in the 
category of delivering ‘private goods’ and only to finance those providing ‘public 
goods’. 
Given the meagre success of the privatisation process in many developing countries, it 
is possible that the analysis failed to take into account some important and decisive 
factors. As mentioned earlier, this classification of goods or services did not consider 
some influencing factors such as the political and institutional context nor physical 
constraints. It is therefore relevant to re-examine the taxonomy of goods applied in 
the analysis of AHS under the outcome approach and highlight the pitfalls and 
consequences that might have derived from its application. 
3.1  The taxonomy of public and private goods 
Rather than elaborating on the distinction between private and public goods, this 
study focuses on the degree of 'publicness' of goods because this determines whether 
such goods or services are financed and/or provided by the market or by governments 
(11). However, in order to assess how 'public' goods and services are, they need to be 
examined and only then can the appropriateness of provision and finance be 
determined. 
Public goods were categorised by Samuelson in 1954 (31) along the lines of the 
principles of rivalry
31 and excludability
32. This categorisation has been widely debated 
in the economic literature. Samuelson’s definition of public goods began a debate in 
which several leading economists argued the difficulty in finding public goods in the 
purest sense. Examples such as law and order and defence, typically assumed to be 
public goods in the purest sense, were criticised by authors like Margolis (32) and 
Sandler (33). They argued that even these examples did not fully comply with 
Samuelson’s definition
33. The same applies to the classical example of lighthouses, 
which was counteracted by Coase for the same reasons (34). Hence the debate should 
not focus on the two extremes, namely pure private goods and public goods, but on 
the myriad of impure public goods existing between the extremes. 
Three ways have been argued in which good can be classified (11). The first derives 
from Head (35) and Peston (36) and focuses on the characteristics of the good, i.e. the 
classical approach to excludability and rivalry in consumption. The second, supported 
by authors such as Musgrave (14) and, in a similar way, Weisbrod (37), is based on the 
                                                 
30 Although one might argue that Leonard started talking about user fees for the AHS in 1985 (3). 
31 Rival principle: two persons cannot enjoy a specific benefit at the same time. 
32 Exclusion principle: access is denied to persons who have not paid for this product or service. 
33 “In the provision of law and order (or medical care), the use of individual A of law courts (or hospitals) subtracts from 
consumption by individual B if they must now wait”. Defence, generally associated with protection, may not either 
completely satisfy the ‘pure’ public good definition. For example, a situation in which armies are employed in the north, 
“will this not detract from protection for communities in the south?” (11). 3. Defining public goods 
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assessment of the mix of services/benefits that stem from the provision of the good, 
also referred to as ‘mixed goods or quasi-public goods’. Finally the third, supported by 
Buchanan (38), relates to the different levels of consumption sharing, which refers to 
the relationship existing between the degree of indivisibility and the number of 
people consuming the good. 
In the animal healthcare sector only one type of analysis has been performed to date 
and this relates to the first categorisation (see Umali et al. (2) and Holden (9)). This 
approach is re-examined below and two new ways of approaching AHS taxonomy are 
proposed. 
3.1.1  Excludability and rivalry 
One approach to the taxonomy of goods is to focus on their characteristics with 
respect to excludability and rivalry. Following Head and Peston’s classification, four 
categories can be obtained (Table 1). Category D, goods that are non-rival and non-
excludable in consumption, are pure public goods. At the other extreme, category A, 
lie the pure private goods, which are both excludable and rival in consumption. 
Category B refers to sharing of common resources, known as common pool goods, 
where no one can be denied access but the service profits exclusively the user
34 and 
detracts from the possible use by others. Finally, excludable but non-rival goods are 
also referred to as toll goods (C) because a payment limits the number of users asking 
of the service, but once paid, each individual admitted may consume services without 
subtracting from the benefit to others (within capacity limits)
35. 
Table 1:   Taxonomy of goods (adapted from Cullis and Jones, 1998 (11)) 
  Excludable  Non-
excludable 
Rival  A B 
Non-rival  C D 
 
Several authors have used these terms in order to classify goods and services provided 
by animal health systems (2, 40, 41). However, the most extensive interpretation of 
this technique was elaborated by Holden (9). Given the previously mentioned 
controversy regarding the existence of pure public goods following the two principles, 
Holden’s categorisation followed the criteria of ‘low’ and ‘high’ rivalry and 
excludability. She then associated the categorised goods to what empirically is 
supposed to be the adequate funding mechanism. The results her assessment are 
presented in Table 2. The list of goods and services included in the example is not 
exhaustive and does not include some of the major components of AHS (refer to Figure 
1, page 12). The classification of some of the examples is also debatable, as well as 
their associated source of financing. These examples (items (a) to (l) in Table 2) are 
discussed below. 
In relation to goods included in category A, given their characteristics – high rivalry 
and high excludability - theoretically there is a strong incentive for the private buyer 
                                                 
34 For further detail, refer to Meade (1952) (39) for the classical example of bees from hives of different beekeepers and the 
collection of nectar from a nearby orchard of apples.  
35 For further detail, refer to Buchanan (1965) (38) and the ‘Theory of Clubs’. 3. Defining public goods 
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or consumer to pay for the good or service. Examples of these, mentioned by Holden, 
include clinical services, use of vaccines and veterinary pharmaceuticals and 
prevention and control of endemic diseases. However, one might argue that even 
items in category A (particularly item (a)) may have positive spillovers to other 
herders, for example under common grazing. However, Holden mentions that ‘private 
benefits of vaccination against endemic diseases usually outweigh the benefit to 
others’ (9), which is true, but  holds equally true for vaccination against epidemic 
diseases. 
Some debate may also surround the association of clinical services (e), and vaccine 
and drug sales (b) to private financing (i.e. by the end user). One of the underlying 
reasons behind private goods delivery is the need for enough aggregated demand for 
these services or goods to be delivered through adequate market competition. This 
implies the existence of multiple service providers and users. Therefore, depending on 
the context, either physical or institutional, such aggregated demand might not be 
sufficient to leave these goods or services to end users’ private funding. An example 
of such situation are remote pastoral areas where subsistence farming is common. The 
ability to pay
36 for such services or goods might be too low and the aggregated 
demand for the services would not be sufficiently high to stimulate provision through 
market competition. Thus, the goods or services, despite having characteristics of 
private goods, might not be adequately delivered without a certain degree of public 
(co-)funding. 
                                                 
36 We separate ability to pay from willingness to pay (WTP) in this example as many studies (e.g. Ahuja et al. 
(7) have demonstrated that poor livestock keepers are willing to pay for clinical services but are not always 
able to pay for such services given their low economic situation. 3. Defining public goods 
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Table 2:   Classification of goods following the rivalry and excludability principles (adapted 
from Holden, 1999 (9)) 
EXCLUDABILITY   








!  Endemic disease control and 
prevention (a) 
!  Sales of drugs and vaccines (b) 
!  Some extension (c)  
!  Some research (d)  
!  Clinical services (e) 
 
PRIVATE FINANCE                          
A 
COMMON POOL GOODS 
 
!  Tsetse control on communal land 






















!  Vaccine production (f)  
!  Diagnostic services (g) 
!  Veterinary clinics (h) 








!  Epidemic or zoonotic disease 
control (surveillance, movement 
control, quarantine services) (k) 
!  Some extension 
!  Some research  
!  Control of food borne diseases (l) 
 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE         
 D 
 
Given the characteristics of toll goods, economic theory suggests that these should 
mainly be financed or paid for by end users. Examples mentioned by Holden include 
vaccine production units (f), units for diagnostic/laboratory services (g), veterinary 
clinics (h) and dipping facilities (i). Her stated reasons for inclusion of such goods or 
services in this category are that these examples include treating several animals or 
process several samples at the same time, i.e. there is low rivalry, but non-paying 
users can be excluded from the service. i.e. high excludability. However, one might 
argue against veterinary clinics being classified as toll goods given that services are 
generally paid as a function of the animal treated and the amount and type of drugs 3. Defining public goods 
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needed. Therefore, it might be more accurate to classify them into the private good 
category in Holden’s interpretation of Head and Peston’s classification. Because of 
their high excludability characteristics, toll goods are usually financed privately by the 
consumer. However, the same argument would apply to these goods in relation to the 
end user payment as was used for the provision of private good, namely that in 
remote rural areas these services would not be economically reachable for subsistence 
livestock keepers. Most of these services, though, exist in highly production areas. 
Aggregated demand in such settings is high enough to enable market competition; 
nevertheless some public sector co-financing might be needed in the first phase of 
establishment of these facilities given their high set-up costs. 
In relation to vaccine production (f), diagnostic services (g) and dipping facilities (i), 
Holden argues that these services “may treat several animals or process several 
samples at one time (i.e. low rivalry) but can exclude non-paying users from the 
service (high excludability)” (9). Dipping facilities represent an example of the 
questionability of the applied allocation of goods into Head and Peston’s classification 
as the efficiency of the product used in the dips will be reduced by increased use and 
hence the service is indeed rival. The first herd passing through the dipping facility 
will be better protected than the third. Rivalry might therefore be higher than 
postulated. The same can hold true for diagnostic services, where the number of 
samples that can be processed at any one time is limited leading to at least rivalry in 
the timing of consumption of the service (i.e. some consumers may have to wait until 
their samples will be processed). The characteristic of these examples lead to 
Buchanan’s theory of clubs (38), which is based on a classification of goods which uses 
the degree of consumption sharing of a good among a certain population. This 
classification will be further elaborated later in this chapter. 
It is when talking about categories B (common pool goods) and D (public goods) that 
we encounter most difficulty in classifying goods into separate and distinctive cells 
following Umali and Holden’s rationale. Given the nature of common pool goods, non-
paying users cannot be prevented from using the good or service, while increased 
consumption of the good diminishes supply for others. As non-paying users cannot be 
prevented access, there is no incentive for the consumer to pay for the service. Hence 
people tend to ‘free-ride’. Trypanosomosis control on communal land using traps, 
targets or aerial spraying (j) to make the land accessible by cattle is an example 
mentioned by Holden. In one sense this example would perfectly fall into its assigned 
category. However, trypanosomosis control may have positive externalities not only 
related to decreasing cattle mortality rates but also by lowering the occurrence of 
(human) sleeping sickness. Therefore, trypanosomosis control may not only have 
characteristics of a common pool good but also of a public good if its zoonotic disease 
aspects are considered. 
Due to the low excludability of public goods, access to their benefits cannot be 
restricted to the people paying for them. Thus, as with common pool goods, there is a 
tendency for some people not to pay for the good or service and free-ride. These 
situations tend to lead to under-provision or no provision of such goods by private 
providers. The control of highly contagious animal diseases with high mortality rates 
and severe socio-economic implications (for example rinderpest), and of zoonotic 
diseases would fall into this category. In the event of occurrence of such diseases, the 
socio-economic and/or public health repercussions for the nation can be high, which 
might be especially important in developing countries given their relatively high 
contribution of agriculture to wealth generation and employment. It is only the 
intervention of the state, financed through a form of taxation, which can force all 
beneficiaries to pay for the good or service. Therefore, vaccination, surveillance, 
quarantine and movement restrictions for epidemic diseases and the control of 
zoonotic/food-borne diseases are normally covered by state finance. When focusing 
on the control of food-borne diseases (l), Holden rightly mentions that this task has 3. Defining public goods 
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“traditionally been considered as public good as the state benefits from lower health 
care costs” (9). 
However the above examples of public goods raise the issue of who is the end 
beneficiary of animal health services: society as a whole, the population of farmers or 
the state government? To put it differently: What ‘public’ is referred to when talking 
about ‘public goods’? The example of an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in a 
meat exporting country may be taken to illustrate this point. In the event of an FMD 
outbreak in this country, the poorest consumers may be the main beneficiaries as 
prices of beef and other exported bovine products are likely to fall as export markets 
close down. However, farmers and governments will not benefit as export bans will be 
imposed, reducing their economic benefits (lower prices for beef in the case of cattle 
farmers and less revenue from export duties for the state). 
The above example relates to the previously described influence of powerful ‘interest 
groups’ over decision-making processes (Section 2.4). Economic theory defines a good 
as ‘public’ when it affects society as a whole. The extent to which an export ban due 
to an outbreak of FMD negatively affects society as a whole is debatable and will vary 
between countries. In most instances the control of epidemic livestock diseases, 
although it requires government participation to put into place required legislation for 
the avoidance of free-riders and the enforcement of control measures, provides a 
‘public’ good only for a subset of society. 
Although the financing of public goods will need to be of public origin, the actual 
delivery of the good or services can be contracted out to private service providers. At 
this level, regulation and enforcement are of crucial importance to guarantee the 
quality of services delivered. Regulation and quality assurance are not always simple 
and an added incentive for the provision of quality services is through enhancement of 
consumer awareness about the service they can expect. The BSE episode in the UK 
represents an important example of power shift from an industry to consumers. 
Consumers’ associations pressed for increased transparency in relation to the origin 
and processing methods of food products. As painful as the episode might have been, 
the results are that consumers are more ‘educated’ and sensitised in relation to 
hazards coming from the food they consume. They therefore demand the enforcement 
of regulations for consumer protection, diminishing the power of the food industries in 
the decision-making processes. 
It must remembered that the economic nature of given services is dynamic. Rivalry 
and excludability of a service are subject to change over time due to development of 
new techniques for disease control, changes in the regulatory framework or in the 
information environment. An example of technological improvement is trypanosomosis 
control. Originally, trypanosomosis control was carried out through aerial spraying, 
benefiting all farmers in an area, regardless of who had paid for the service (i.e. low 
excludability). However, technological advances have led to the development of drugs 
and ‘pour-on’ insecticides, therefore changing the degree of publicness of 
trypanosomosis control as the intervention can be more ‘individualised’ and therefore 
of higher excludability (9). 
Head and Peston’s technique might be questioned in so far as the “same ‘good’ may 
fall into one category under one set of circumstances and into another category under 
other sets” (36). Even so, within the different categories it is possible to develop the 
requirements for efficiency in provision. Perhaps the most susceptible category for 
that is category C (see Buchanan and theory of clubs). Valid as it might have been, 
Umali and Holden’s categorisation of goods, as we have argued, can be contested. 
Two main questions derive from the above debate that might shed light on the reasons 
for failure of the privatisation process. These are: (i) For whom is a good “public” in 3. Defining public goods 
20 
the AH sector (i.e. what is the targeted population)? and (ii) What is the context 
(physical and/or institutional) in which it has to be delivered? 
The following sections will re-examine the classification of goods taking into account 
the two above questions and will highlight their implications for policy making. 
3.1.2  Mixed goods/quasi-public goods 
The second type of approach to the classification of impure public goods focuses on 
the mix of services that stem from the provision of the good. This approach was first 
taken by Musgrave (14) and in the AHS field it has been adopted by Leonard (4) and 
Koma (6). Research of the latter in Uganda strongly suggested that the method of 
conceptualising goods based on their externalities is preferable to the initially used 
public-private good categorisation. Reasons stated were first that the externalities 
approach lends itself more readily to degrees of difference as public versus private 
goods is categorical and handles mixed types awkwardly; and second, that the 
approach “leads one to do a better job in evaluating the adequacy of private demand, 
because it quantifies rather than categorises both internal and external benefits” (4). 
Starting with two abstract examples, extension (c) and research (d) have shown the 
difficulty of categorising goods in separate ‘cells’ following the public private good 
technique. The outcome of research might have characteristics of a private good in 
that a patent on a product results in economic profits for a specific company. 
However, at the same time, it enhances knowledge on, for example, disease 
prevention and treatment. This has external benefits therefore bears characteristics 
of a public good as the whole society will profit from it. Similarly, 
education/extension directed towards individual farmers might have the potential of 
increasing the farmer’s future production and income. But at the same time it may, 
for example, (i) limit disease outbreaks which could have affected other farmers or 
even a nation’s economy, (ii) might increase future generations’ knowledge regarding 
production management and (iii) facilitate basic research, creating non-rival and non-
excludable knowledge or information which benefits others in the community
37.  
This perspective contrasts with the previous categorisation as, in the case of 
extension, public good characteristics were considered only if the extension messages 
were broadcast (radio etc) and were classified as private goods only if given to 
farmers individually. A more concrete example would be a farmer who vaccinates his 
herd against CBPP. He benefits from the protection conferred to his animals, but at 
the same time as he creates a personal benefit he may also create an external benefit 
in so far as the chance of infection of the neighbouring herds is diminished. It is clear 
that the external effect of the consumption of a private good (the vaccine) may bear 
characteristics of public good. Recognition of private-public mix means that goods can 
be viewed as having private benefits as well as external effects, which support the 
characteristic of public goods (for a clear distinction between public goods and 
externalities see Evans, 1970 (20)). 
This externality approach to dealing with the blend of privateness and publicness in 
goods was dealt with by Musgrave in 1969 (14) and its importance lies in that it 
provides an important framework for policy purposes. It would allow the effects of a 
new policy to be determined by calculating the costs and benefits of its introduction. 
However, given the pervasive characteristics of externalities, operationalising this 
approach may prove to be difficult. One attempt may be to take the ratio of spillover 
                                                 
37 Of course one might argue that these examples are distant consequences of extension and education, and 
therefore disagree with the classification of impure public goods in relation to their degree of externalities. 3. Defining public goods 
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benefit to private benefit and classify items in a range order between 1 and 0 (11). 
Measuring the effect of spillover at different levels (animal and human) might be a 
cumbersome and debatable task, although one way to approach it would be through 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA), taking the ratio of external benefits to private benefits as 
an indicator of the private-public mix and the extent of publicness. 
CBA can be used in the private as well as in the public context. In the case of private 
CBA, the objective is to decide whether to undertake investment in the context of a 
particular firm, in the case of livestock a farm. In the public context, social CBA is a 
useful tool for deciding which policies to implement. Two main differences arise 
between private and social CBAs (13). First, in relation to private CBA, profitability is 
the major concern whereas, in the government context, concerns focus on a much 
broader range of consequences (e.g. public health, environment, equity, etc). Second, 
while private CBA uses market prices for evaluating costs and benefits, social CBA 
cannot use market prices in evaluating projects for outputs and inputs that are not 
sold in the market
38, and when there is market failure. The latter refers to a situation 
where prices do not represent a project’s social costs or benefits. Social CBA focuses 
on developing systematic ways in which costs and benefits can be analysed when 
market prices do not reflect social costs and benefits (13).  
When talking about the evaluation of public expenditure through CBA, concerns focus 
on how governments ‘should’ appraise alternative expenditure projects. CBAs have 
been established on the assumption that governments seek “benevolently to maximise 
social welfare” (11). It is a framework for incorporating the multitude of 
considerations that arise when assessing the desirability of projects. However, no 
claims are made that it is a perfect method capable of yielding unambiguously correct 
estimates of change of welfare associated with different investment programmes. 
R a t h e r ,  i t  s h o u l d  b e  v i e w e d  a s  a  m e t h o d  for governments to tackle the questions 
arising when appraising public sector investment. 
Two problems arise in CBA in the public context. First, and in relation to positive 
economics, problems arise when trying to estimate social benefits
39 obtained from a 
certain animal health intervention. In other words, the problem relates to how 
investments are valued. Several authors in the AH field have attempted to make the 
case for further elaboration of CBA techniques in relation to animal healthcare 
services (42-44). However, as argued by Ramsay et al. (45), most of the existing 
studies lack carefully documented analysis and procedures or, as mentioned by Roth 
et al. (personal communication), there is a lack of reliable data. Second, and in 
relation to normative economics, CBAs are not exempt from political influence and 
interference. The question behind the use of CBA for normative issues is that of which 
investment should be chosen. Hence, the public choice analysis of how investment is 
chosen is related far more to political costs and benefits (11). As mentioned by Cullis 
and Jones, “the fact that government departments invest time and effort when 
undertaking cost-benefit analysis does not preclude the possibility that they are 
motivated far more by political factors than by welfare economics” (11) and highlights 
the susceptibility to regulatory capture from powerful industries. 
                                                 
38 Such as clean water or lives saved. 
39 In the case of performing CBAs for an animal health intervention, the obstacles and criticisms, and especially technical 
difficulties and surrounding controversies, will arise from (i) giving an economic weight to a certain human health condition 
(in the case of zoonosis), (ii) to give an economic weight to the consequences in human health due to protein loss for human 
diet as a consequence of animal mortality or productivity loss, (iii) to evaluation of the health care costs incurred due to the 
(human) disability condition and (iv) estimating the social costs experienced by an epidemic animal disease which, for 
example, bans animal and derived products exports for a determined period of time. This is not an exhaustive list therefore 
other causes may feed into the above-mentioned controversy. 3. Defining public goods 
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In a similar way, but approaching the problem from the opposite end, Weisbrod in 
1988 (37) tried to use the way in which goods are financed as an indicator of the 
public and private benefits of a good or service. The more public the benefits of a 
good are, the less organisations will finance themselves through sale of the good, as 
there are no direct property rights that can be enjoyed on a non-excludable basis. 
Therefore, the more an organisation relies on gifts, grants and donations, the more 
public are the effects this organisation has. Weisbrod argues along these lines to 
defend the subsidy given to not-for-profit organisations. An example of this 
perspective in the AH field would relate to the ‘split-financing’ of FMD eradication in 
Europe. 
The ‘quasi-public good’ perspective differs from the public-private categorisation of 
goods in that it tries to evaluate in economic terms the private-public mix of benefits 
stemming from a policy intervention. This implies that context, both physical and 
institutional, is taken into account in the evaluation, as well as assessing the ‘blend of 
publicness’ of consequences deriving from it. Therefore, this taxonomy type may well 
serve as a tool for decision-making processes in the animal healthcare sector. 
However, what this approach does not take into account are the arrangements related 
to optimisation of resource allocation at lower levels within subgroups (i.e. service 
provision level). This is explored next. 
3.1.3  Consumption sharing 
Finally the third approach to classifying goods and services was developed by 
Buchanan in 1968 (46). He portrayed the relationship existing between the degree of 
indivisibility and the number of people consuming the good or service
40 (Figure 2). 
Special attention should be drawn to situations (2), (3) and (4). 
Figure 1:  Consumption sharing (adapted from Buchanan, 1968) (46) 
 
                                                 
40 His categorisation was based on the assumption of a given population and given property rights. 
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In essence, the key of Buchanan’s theory is the degree to which consumption sharing 
is possible in a given population. As in the case of this study the perspective taken 
when applying Buchanan’s theory to AHS will focus on farmers or livestock keepers. 
Item (1) refers to private goods or services which are fully divisible between few 
individuals (or farmers). An example for the AHS would be clinical treatment or 
diagnostic tests for a given farmer
41. Services that are fully divisible between farmers 
or livestock keepers ‘should’ be left to market provision. On the other extreme, item 
(5) relates to public goods, completely indivisible over a large group of people. An 
example would be trypanosomosis control in a specific district, which would be fully 
indivisible between livestock keepers, and each farmer, as well as the rest of the 
population of this district
42, will profit from the services. Item (3) may refer to 
services such as vaccination against a highly contagious disease, which provides a 
degree of protection for all neighbouring farmers.  
When focusing on group (2), extension services at a community level might be taken 
as an example. Extension (a relatively indivisible service) under these conditions may 
be given to a small number of livestock keepers. Hence, services are shared between 
a small number of people. Following Buchanan, service provision in this category 
might be left to voluntary arrangements between the individual members of the small 
group concerned, in this case livestock keepers.  
Category (4) contains goods or services that are highly indivisible and are used by a 
small number of people. These are the so-called ‘Clubs’. These could be cooperatives 
or farmers' associations where, for example, dipping facilities could be used by all 
members (i.e. those who have paid a premium or fee). The service will be provided as 
long as the number of members is not excessive
43 (i.e. no congestion). Clubs are 
arrangements in the private sector by which goods are to a certain degree non-rival in 
consumption and voluntarily provided. Typically the good is excludable (i.e. 
membership fee) but this is by no means private (i.e. below capacity limits 
consumption is non-rival). Buchanan (38) contributed to the understanding of the 
establishment of efficiency conditions for the provision of such goods via clubs.  
Viewing impure public goods in this way enables consideration of the appropriate 
provision of a range of goods bearing both ‘public’ and ‘private’ characteristics. In 
some instances this approach has called into question the appropriate role for the 
public sector. Goods that are not perfectly public might perhaps be better supplied 
through the market. On the other hand, there are some conditions under which it 
might be appropriate for governments to provide private goods. 
                                                 
41 Evidently, tests are done to the animals, but the farmer is considered as an entity by itself (might well also be called 
farm). 
42 In that case not only livestock keepers or farmers will profit from not losing their animals because of the disease (hence 
reducing productivity loss), but collaterally the inhabitants of the district will also profit from not being at risk of sleeping 
sickness. 
43 It could be argued that the effectiveness of the dipping product diminished with use, thus incurring some level of rivalry.  24 
4.  PUBLICLY-PROVIDED PRIVATE GOODS 
Prior to the drive towards privatisation animal health systems initiated by the World 
Bank, component services tended to be mainly funded and provided by government. 
This has been particularly the case in sub-Saharan African countries prior to the 1990s. 
Conversely, in Asian countries these services continue to be financed and supplied 
mostly by the government
44. In the following, this study will focus on ways in which 
governments are theoretically able to control over-consumption of publicly provided 
private goods. The analysis also aims to provide options to limit the negative 
consequences the privatisation process might have in remote rural remote areas. This 
does not imply, however, that AH service delivery in remote rural areas was of high-
performance prior to privatisation. 
Following economic theory, publicly provided private goods or services are those for 
which there is a large marginal cost associated with supplying additional individuals. 
An example is service delivery in remote rural areas where the costs of reaching an 
additional farmer might be high. Though the costs of participating in a market (for 
example distance deters private involvement as transport costs are higher the farther 
places are - e.g. pastoral setting – thus hindering profitability) provide one of the 
rationales for public supply of some of these goods, it is not the only or even the most 
important rationale. Sometimes when governments provide a private good publicly it 
simply allows individuals to consume as much as they want without charge. Hence, if 
provided publicly there is a tendency of over-consumption. In some cases this over-
consumption might be limited as in the case of water supply (where satiation can be 
reached), but in the case of animal healthcare market the distortion from over-
consumption may be very large.  
When there is a marginal cost associated with each individual using a good, it may be 
more efficient to provide the good publicly and finance the good through general 
taxation even though providing the good publicly causes distortion (13). In the human 
health setting, as mentioned in Evan’s example in the previous section (23), the high 
costs related to private markets providing insurance has been used as an argument for 
the public provision of insurance. The role of government in the context of pastoral 
and remote areas is discussed next, first for the case that the privatisation process has 
not yet been fully implemented and, second, for the case that such process has 
already been undertaken. 
4.1  The case of remote rural/pastoral areas 
In most developing countries animal healthcare was publicly provided before the 
1990s. As a result of the macroeconomic context and the crisis of national public 
finances, an abrupt process of privatisation of most government services, including 
animal healthcare, was initiated. The fact that there was a very short or even no 
transition period from public to private service provision in the animal health sector, 
caused serious disruptions in many areas. Especially vulnerable were the remote rural 
areas where, after government pulled out, no animal health service was available with 
the exception of some NGO initiatives. 
It is interesting to compare this process in the animal health field to the counterpart 
in human healthcare. Given that in most developing countries, and especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, there was a widespread lack of funds, human health services were also 
harmed. However, and probably the main difference with the AH sector, was that at 
                                                 
44 In India privatisation has started to a certain degree. 4. Publicly-provided private goods 
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the same time as the privatisation process took place, there was a widespread 
acknowledgement of the need to maintain a minimum standard of healthcare. This 
crystallised in 1978 through the Alma Ata conference (organised by the World Health 
Organisation) (47) where the idea of primary health care arose and a common 
objective was set. A programme was created, which was called “Health for All”. Most 
countries adhered to this view and hence ministries of health around the world and 
other stakeholders put effort into attaining this goal. 
As mentioned by Berman (48) in relation to the human healthcare sector and the 
Health for All programme, in order to expand and integrate community-based 
programmes into a national structure, there should be an enabling institutional 
context. This implies a common goal and willingness on the part of the involved policy 
makers. The debate surrounding this integration of community-based initiatives into a 
wider health system and the related problems has been widely debated in the human 
healthcare literature (49-51). It is evident that AHS do not convey the same ethical 
implications as HHS. However, the relevance of this comparison relates to 
governance. The AH sector has not been able to describe a common goal or purpose 
during or even after the privatisation process, and this refers not only to national 
governments but, more importantly, to the international community. Consequently, 
there has been an uncoordinated transition without a common vision. Such lack of 
coordination has led to an important increase in transaction costs, rendering the AH 
services more and more ineffective and inefficient. 
4.1.1  The role of government in a pre-privatisation setting 
Continuing the comparison with the human health care sector, rationing devices were 
progressively introduced in the human health field through Primary Health Care
45 
(PHC) programmes with the aim of cutting healthcare costs. Measures to reduce 
demand, either from suppliers or patients, were therefore implemented. Such 
planning was missing during AHS privatisation in most nations. 
In countries where privatisation of AHS has not been yet fully or even partially 
implemented, i.e. cases where ‘private’ animal health services are still being 
provided to a certain extent by the government, there are three ways in which the 
government could control the (over-) consumption of publicly-provided private goods 
(13). These are (i) rationing consumption (i.e. user charges), (ii) uniform provision, 
and (iii) queuing. 
As previously mentioned, inefficiencies arise from over-consumption of publicly-
provided services. In the HHS, governments imposed user charges on services provided 
in order to reduce or limit their consumption and hence government expenditure. 
Independently from the controversy surrounding the use of charges (especially when 
referring to poor income earning people
46), rationing methods could have been used 
during the transition process to limit the ‘superficial’ demand for animal health 
services. In the same way that the introduction of charges would have limited 
demand, it would also have helped to increase the government’s budget (at a local, 
regional or national level, depending on the country’s decentralisation status) for 
animal health services and using the public funds for targeted public good 
interventions. It should however be mentioned that partial cost-recovery methods 
have already been introduced in some AH delivery programmes. 
                                                 
45 In the human healthcare system, primary health care (PHC) refers to the first point of access or attendance of care. 
Secondary health care refers in the same context, to services offered in hospital facilities.  
46 Equity issues arise when referring to user fees.  4. Publicly-provided private goods 
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Uniform provision refers to supplying the same quantity of the good to everyone. 
However, this mechanism does not allow for adaptation of different individual’s needs 
and desires as does the private market (13). This characteristic is of most importance 
in the animal healthcare field as the needs in different rural or pastoral areas might 
greatly vary. A government policy of uniform provision of animal healthcare services 
would not be advisable. 
Finally, the third way through which the government might control over-consumption 
of publicly provided services is through queuing. The underlying rationale is that, 
rather than charging individuals for access to publicly provided services, the 
government requires that they pay in waiting time. This measure is based on the idea 
that money is an undesirable way to ration medical related services. Queues are 
supposed to be an effective device to discriminate between those who are truly needy 
and those less in need. Willingness to pay has in effect been replaced as a criterion 
for allocating medical services by ‘willingness to wait’ (13). However, one might argue 
that waiting time incurs alternative social costs to the government that might be 
higher than with other rationing devices. 
In the case of animal health services however it does not seem reasonable to make 
herders and livestock travel long distances to reach veterinary assistance as diseased 
animals may not be able to walk or will lose too much weight and condition during the 
trip. Most herders would therefore be more interested in selling the diseased animal 
at a lower price or slaughter it (without inspection, therefore possibly incurring 
human healthcare costs), rather than risking its complete loss. Hence, costs incurred 
due to the lack of access or the waiting time to receive animal health services may 
impact at the individual level (loss of the economic value of the animal), at the 
community level (as livestock has high social value in these areas) and at national 
level. In relation to the latter, if herders do not have access to animal health services, 
or have to wait for the services to come to them (in the case of community-based 
workers or other services), an outbreak of an epidemic disease such as FMD or 
rinderpest would go undetected and uncontrolled for longer than necessary thus 
increasing the risk of substantial spread. If the outbreak is not contained, the entire 
nation’s exports might be hindered due to the imposition of an export ban. Therefore, 
the consequences of this ‘waiting time’ would have high social costs at a national 
level. 
The underlying assumption for public provision of private goods or services is the 
existence of an ‘efficient’ government. It has been shown that many governments fail 
to provide services efficiently as they incur high transaction costs related to political 
and individual interests. Quantification of transaction costs to compare differences in 
efficiency between market and government provision of goods or services might, 
however, be technically and practically difficult. 
Applying user charges would therefore be the main device to help limiting government 
expenditure, hence slowly moving towards a more privatised system where 
government would play an added role, concentrating on provision of goods with high 
degree of publicness. 
4.1.2  The role of government post-privatisation 
In countries where privatisation of AHS has been undertaken, there is a need to 
explore ways in which the delivery of services can be improved and their financing can 
be secured. As in the previous section, special attention is given to remote rural 
areas. Given the physical context encountered in these areas (lack of infrastructure, 
water, electricity and often the presence of high insecurity) it would seem there is a 
rationale for public provision of animal healthcare. Following Williamson’s economics, 4. Publicly-provided private goods 
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what is being advocated here is the action of the government as an overall 
coordinator. Additionally, another role for the government would be facilitating the 
institutional context. 
The first role would involve the remaining government animal health services in rural 
areas as well as at other levels such as district and national. These could play a key 
role in decreasing the existing transaction costs by coordinating current ongoing field 
activities. These activities might range from private or business-oriented delivery of 
animal health service, to NGO initiatives. Examples of this coordination role would 
vary from setting national goals for delivery of primary animal healthcare (PAHC) 
(such as integrating into a common PAHC goal the existing programmes, be they 
private or not-for-profit), to more logistical activities, such as facilitating networks for 
drug supply. 
The second activity, which in turn relates to the previous one, is facilitating an 
institutional context for PAHC
47 delivery. This function is of interest for developing 
countries as it might help rural livestock owners accessing regional markets
48 (i.e. in 
the same country or in some instances in neighbouring countries). For stock owners to 
be able to sell their livestock and derived products in these zones there is a need for a 
coordinated and integrated animal healthcare service at a national level so as to 
assure minimum quality standards in live animals and derived products
49. Delivery of 
AH services in remote rural areas therefore represents a challenge in terms of AHS 
reliability to reach these standards. An interesting case is that of Kenya and the 
acceptance of CAHWs. Reluctance exists from some members of the Kenyan 
Veterinary Board (KVB) to legalise and integrate CAHWs in the Veterinary Act, in spite 
of the latest recommendations of the OIE in relation to veterinary para-professionals 
(52). If these para-professionals are not legally accepted (and in practical terms 
adequately supervised
50) there is the possibility that livestock and derived products 
may be rejected in local or regional markets on public health and/or animal health 
grounds.  
There is, nevertheless a need to assess effective ways to increase government 
resources for funding animal health services. There is also the need to explore existing 
and new possibilities for the private sector to fund and provide these Services. 
                                                 
47 The Primary Animal Health Care (PAHC) concept refers to the AH system’s service delivery branch. That is: the first 
contact point for livestock keepers with AH services. PAHC would therefore include initiatives such as CAH systems (which 
might be business oriented, NGO managed or government run), veterinary aid centres, mobile dispensaries, etc. The nature 
of PAHC will differ between countries. Hence for example in sub-Saharan Africa PAHC will mainly include CAH systems as AH 
service delivery branch, whereas in India veterinary aid centres and mobile dispensaries will be more common.  
48 However, other factors are needed (such as transport and infrastructure) and that does not exclude the existence of illegal 
export markets.  
49 Of course one might argue that in some of these localities official inspection is lacking and, if to some extent it exists, 
parallel markets tend to arise due to the lack of enforcement.  
50 This would relate to the organization and structure of CAH systems, especially in relation to the supervision of CAHWs by 
qualified professionals.  28 
5.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study demonstrates that the economic analysis of AHS has moved from an 
outcome oriented perspective towards a more process oriented point of view. Hence, 
the animal healthcare market is viewed in a broader context where political 
interference, self-interested behaviour and other transaction costs are considered. 
This relatively new perspective (in the AH sector) leads to the identification of factors 
that were not taken into account in the first economic analyses of AHS, factors that 
may however have had some influence on the failure of the privatisation process in 
some countries. 
The public choice school’s perspective gives a new approach to the analysis of the 
animal health care sector and sheds light on how to avoid similar errors in ongoing and 
future privatisation processes. Central to the public choice school is the view of the 
government as part of the AHS market and not only as an external agent with 
regulatory power. Special attention has been given to its role in relation to 
governance. This perspective contemplates the government as a key element in 
harmonising and facilitating not only the market economy, hence as a means for 
reducing existing transaction costs, but also in defining overall goals for the animal 
healthcare system. An important factor to be taken into account relates to corruption 
at a governmental level. 
The following conclusions and policy recommendations emerge from this study: 
•  The application of economic theory to guide the process of privatisation of animal 
health systems varies in relation to several factors and the privatisation process 
cannot to be applied in a homogeneous way. Influencing factors such as the 
physical, political and institutional contexts need to be taken into account. There 
is no standard model applicable to the privatisation process. 
•  The role of government should be viewed at a broader level as coordinator of 
activities in the animal healthcare sector (increasing cross-sector collaboration), 
the aim being not only to reduce transaction costs, but also, and especially, to 
guide current initiatives towards a common goal for AHS. 
•  In countries that have not undergone privatisation, cost-containment measures 
could be applied in order to smooth the transition process to a privatised AH 
market (where applicable). 
•  In countries where privatisation has been undertaken, efforts should focus on 
governance of the AHS. 
•  There is a need of further research in relation to the overall AH system’s 
organisation and financing in order to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.  
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